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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS
FOR RELIEF OTHER THAN DAMAGES
Kenneth Culp Davis*
Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon controverted
rights of the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights in con-
troversy between them and the government . 1
This mild proposition, asserted by the Supreme Court in 1882, is
sensible and sound. It should be the law. It is now sometimes the law
and sometimes not. Inconsistencies in Supreme Court holdings on sover-
eign immunity in suits against officers are so flagrant as to make many
decisions seem almost capricious.
Adjudication of controversies is better than settlement of controversies
by sheer force, whether or not the government is one of the parties. Yet a
holding that sovereign immunity is a bar to a decision on the merits when
a state or federal officer is one of the parties means that the controversy
is likely to be disposed of by use of force, or at best by resort to political
power. Even though the courts are especially qualified to decide questions
of law and fact concerning property and contracts and torts, these are
the very questions which the doctrine of sovereign immunity most often
prevents the courts from deciding.
Five powerful reasons show the need for reform: (1) the injustice
of refusing judicial relief when government officers infringe the legal
rights of a private party, (2) the impracticability of substituting force
or political power for adjudication of controversies that courts are
especially qualified to determine, (3) wasteful litigation which stems
from judicial fluctuation from one line of authority to another, (4) the
almost unbelievable lack of specific judicial inquiry into reasons for the
basic doctrine, and (5) disappearance of the only reasons that supported
the doctrine of sovereign immunity when the doctrine was introduced into
American law during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The fourth factor is indeed an astonishing legal phenomenon. The
doctrine of sovereign immunity came into American law without a judicial
discussion of its merits and demerits,2 and recent Supreme Court opinions
are characteristically lacking in perspective of the doctrine's overall
consequences. The single modem judicial effort to treat the basic doctrine
comprehensively is seriously faulty.3
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 94, for biographical data.
' United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
2 The observation of Mr. justice Miller to this effect is discussed below at page 6.
3 This effort is discussed in detail below at pages 26-30.
3
The fifth factor apparently has never been mentioned in any Supreme
Court opinion. During the first half of the nineteenth century, sovereign
immunity in suits for relief other than damages could reasonably have
been thought desirable in order to prevent the courts from assuming the
burdens of operating the government. The judicial instinct that many or
most issues arising out of governmental activity were nonjusticiable
may have been entirely sound. The Supreme Court in 1840 declared
without qualification: "The interference of the Courts with the per-
formance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the
government, would be productive of nothing but mischief."4 In 1900
the Supreme Court generalized very broadly: "It has been repeatedly
adjudged that the courts have no general supervising power over the
proceedings and action of the various administrative departments of
government."5
Whatever may have been sound in 1840 and in 1900, the twentieth
century has developed highly refined doctrines of unreviewability and
of scope of judicial review.6 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is no
longer needed, as it may once have been, to prevent the courts from
taking over government administration. Now that our elaborate bodies
of law concerning availability and scope of review operate satisfactorily
to prevent the courts from going too far into administration, the main
practical effect of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in suits for relief
other than damages is to prevent the courts from deciding the very
questions they are best qualified to decide-indeed, the very questions
the courts have held that they are best qualified to decide.
Yet neither legislation nor radical change is requisite. No more is
necessary than that the Supreme Court should consistently follow certain
of its past holdings. The thesis of this article is a very conservative one
-that the Supreme Court should resolve the inconsistencies in its hold-
ings on sovereign immunity in suits against state and federal officers for
relief other than money damages, and that in doing so it should follow
the holdings which make for government responsibility and should reject
the holdings which make for government irresponsibility. This proposal
will be elaborated and made more specific in the final pages of this article.
In the ensuing six sections we shall consider: (1) the origin and early
development of the basic doctrine, (2) the cases which develop and
apply the dominant generalization that sovereign immunity does not
4 Decatur v. Paulding,' 14 Pet. 497, 516 (1840).
5 Kein v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
6 These bodies of law are summarized in Davis, Administrative Law 812-928 (1951),
as supplemented by Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411-452 (1954).
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prevent a suit against a state or federal officer who is acting either
beyond his authority or in violation of the Constitution, (3) the cases
which are opposed to this dominant generalization, (4) the holdings both
ways in cases in which no claim is made of excess of authority or un-
constitutionality, (5) judgments in suits against officers as res judicata
against the government when government counsel defend the suits, and
(6) specific recommendations for reform.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its origin neither in the Consti-
tution nor in an interpretation of the Constitution nor in any specific
enactment of Congress.' The doctrine is therefore unquestionably judge-
made, even though it did not come into existence in any specific decision.
In one curious sense the law of sovereign immunity was found and not
made, for it developed not through conscious judicial creation but through
judicial assumption that it had already come into existence.
In 1793, Mr. Justice Wilson, who had attended the Constitutional
Convention, analyzed not only the Constitution but also "the laws and
practice of other States and Kingdoms" and concluded: "We see nothing
against, but much in favour of, the jurisdiction of this Court over the
State of Georgia, a party to this cause."' Chief Justice Jay in the same
case thought the question whether the government could be sued without
its consent should be left open: "I wish the State of society was so far
improved, and the science of Government advanced to such a degree of
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the peaceable course of
law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens.
Whether that is, or is not, now the case, ought not to be thus collaterally
and incidentally decided: I leave it a question."'
According to a later opinion of the Supreme Court,'0 the first recogni-
tion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was in 1821, when Chief
Justice Marshall said: "The universally received opinion is, that no
suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the
judiciary act does not authorize such suits.""
7 The Eleventh Amendment creates sovereign immunity of states in certain suits in the
federal courts. No difference is discernible in modem law between suits against states in
the federal courts, and suits against the United States in federal courts. The two classes
of suits are here considered together, for the principles are common to both classes.
8 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 DalI. 419, 461 (1793).
9 Id. at 478.
1o United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882).
11 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 380 (1821).
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In 1846 the language ripened into holding; a suit to enjoin enforcement
of a judgment against the United States was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, because "the government is not liable to be sued, except with
its own consent, given by law."12 The Court significantly gave no reason
and cited no authority.
When in 1882 the Supreme Court came at last to a direct consideration
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it acknowledged in United States
v. Lee'" that "the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for
it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine."'"
The Court went on to say in effect that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was concerned only with form and not with substance: ".... there
is abundant evidence in the decisions of this court that the doctrine, if
not absolutely limited to cases in which the United States are made
defendants by name, is not permitted to interfere with the judicial
enforcement of the established rights of plaintiffs when the United States
is not a defendant or a necessary party to the suit."'15 The Court went
on to quote from the 1824 opinion 6f Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn
v. Bank: ".... if the person who is the real principal.., be himself above
the law ... it would be subversive of the best established principles to
say that the laws could not afford the same remedies against the agent
employed in doing the wrong which they would afford against him could
his principal be joined in the suit."' 6
If the Supreme Court had only followed the 1824 lead of Chief Justice
Marshall, which it quoted with approval in 1882, the law of sovereign
immunity would be far more satisfactory than it is today.
The pre-1882 law is neatly summarized by the Court in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Miller in United States v. Lee. The statement of two
earlier cases is especially important: "The cases of The Siren, 7 Wall.
152 [1868], and The Davis, 10 Wall. 15 [1869], are instances where the
court has held that property of the United States may be dealt with by
subjecting it to maritime liens where this can be done without making the
United States a party. This examination of the cases in this court estab-
lishes clearly this result: that the proposition that when an individual
is sued in regard to property which he holds as officer or agent of the
United States, his possession cannot be disturbed when that fact is
brought to the attention of the court, has been overruled and denied in
12 United States v. McLemore, 4 How. 286 (1846).
13 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
14 Id. at 207.
15 Id. at 207-208.
16 Id. at 213, quoting from" Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 842 (1824).
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every case where it has been necessary to decide it.. . From the law
embodied in this 1882 statement of earlier cases, the Court in more
recent times has unfortunately departed, as we shall see.
The holding in United States v. Lee, as well as the comprehensive
opinion, is especially important, for it has become the subject of con-
troversy in recent years. The action was in ejectment "against Strong
and Kaufman, as individuals, to recover possession"'" of 1100 acres of
land. The Court said that "the officers who are sued assert no personal
possession, but are holding as the mere agents of the United States."'19
The Court also noted that the United States was defending the action
"by its proper law officers."2 0 The case came up on "two writs of error
to the same judgment, one prosecuted by the United States, eo nomine,
and the other by the Attorney General of the United States in the names
of Frederick Kaufman and Richard P. Strong, the defendants against
whom judgment was rendered in the circuit court."121
The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff had title to the land in
controversy, and then it considered the contention "that the United
States cannot be lawfully sued without its consent in any case, and that
no action can be maintained against any individual without such consent,
where the judgment must depend on the right of the United States to
property held by such persons as officers or agents for the government."22
The Court stated that "The first branch of this proposition is conceded
to be the established law of this country. .2"' The issue was thus
limited to the second part of the proposition. On that issue the Court
held for the plaintiff.
The Court reasoned that even though the property was devoted to
public uses as a cemetery and as a fort, still "those who are so using it
under the authority of the United States" '24 may be sued for its posses-
sion, because "the verdict of the jury finds that it is and was the private
property of the plaintiff, and was taken without any process of law and
without compensation."2 5 The Court thus relied upon the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. But the major proposition of the opinion
did not rest upon due process: "Courts of justice are established, not
17 106 U.S. at 215-216.
18 Id. at 210.
19 Ibid.
20 Id. at 196-197.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 204.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 217.
25 Id. at 218.
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only to decide upon controverted rights of the citizens as against each
other, but also upon rights in controversy between them and the govern-
ment .... ,26
II. CASES HOLDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY No DEFENSE IN SUITS
AGAINST OFFICERS WHO ALLEGEDLY ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OR IN EXCESS OF AUTHORITY
Sovereign immunity is today sometimes a defense in suits against
officers, and sometimes not. The law of the subject is often uncertain,
for the cases are conflicting. Speaking of its past decisions on the subject,
the Supreme Court said in 1947 that "as a matter of logic it is not easy
to reconcile all of them."2 7
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with unusual frankness, has endeavored to
explain the inconsistencies in the holdings: "The course of decisions
concerning sovereign immunity is a good illustration of the conflicting
considerations that often struggle for mastery in the judicial process, at
least implicitly. In varying degrees, at different times, the momentum
of the historic doctrine is arrested or deflected by an unexpressed feeling
that governmental immunity runs counter to prevailing notions of reason
and justice. Legal concepts are then found available to give effect to
this feeling, and one of its results is the multitude of decisions in which
this Court has refused to permit an agent of the government to claim
that he is pro tanto the government and therefore sheltered by its
immunity.328
Despite the pervasive inconsistencies, the case law is dominated by
one outstanding generalization that is usually followed but sometimes
violated-that sovereign immunity does not prevent a suit against a
state or federal officer who is acting either beyond his authority or in
violation of the Constitution.
The foundation case is Ex parte Young. 9 The Court first held un-
constitutional a Minnesota statute providing for rate fixing and for
penalties for violating rates fixed, and then it inquired into the question
whether the suit to enjoin the state's attorney general was barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. After reviewing eleven previous decisions, the
26 Id. at 220.
27 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947). Another typical acknowledgment appears in Brooks v.
Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359 (1941): "As this Court remarked nearly sixty years ago respect-
ing questions of this kind, they 'have rarely been free from difficulty' and it is not 'an easy
matter to reconcile all the decisions of the court in this class of cases.'" The court cited
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883).
28 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709 (1949).
29 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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Court announced the basic principle: "The various authorities we have
referred to furnish ample justification for the assertion that individuals,
who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the
enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are about
to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such
action."30 The rationale of allowing the suit against the officer was
stated: "The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if
it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional
act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority
of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or govern-
mental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State to enforce a
legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act
which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the
Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and
he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and
is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."'"
Why did the Court say that an officer who acts under an unconstitu-
tional statute is "stripped of his official or representative character"?
Is he not still an officer when he is obeying what the State Legislature
has officially enacted? Is he not still acting in a representative character
when he prosecutes a violator of the enactment? The Court in Ex parte
Young was not confused about these questions; it knew the answers.
It was deliberately indulging in fiction in order to find a way around
sovereign immunity. It knew that the injunction against the attorney
general was in truth a means of preventing the state from enforcing
the statute. The reality is all too obvious that the suit was in practical
effect a suit against the state.
That the Court was not unaware of this reality was doubly assured
by the dissenting words of Mr. Justice Harlan: "The suit was, as to the
defendant Young, one against him as, and only because he was, Attorney
General of Minnesota. No relief was sought against him individually but
only in his capacity as Attorney General. And the manifest-indeed,
the avowed and admitted--object of seeking such relief was to tie the
hands of the state, so that it could not in any manner or by any mode
30 Id. at 155-156.
31 Id. at 159-160.
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of proceeding in its own courts test the validity of the statutes and
orders in question. It would therefore seem clear that within the true
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment the suit brought in the federal court
was one, in legal effect, against the state." 32
The clear meaning of Ex parte Young is that the enforcement officer
may be enjoined even though both the purpose and the effect are to
enjoin the state. The Court allowed the injunction without effectively
denying that the "avowed and admitted" object was "to tie the hands of
the state."
The basic principle of the Young case, even though obviously founded
upon fiction, has become firmly established. This is asserted, for instance,
in the orthodox 1952 opinion in Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Red-
wine.3 3 The company sued the State Revenue Commissioner to enjoin
collection of certain taxes, on the ground that the taxes were in violation
of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Vinson, allowed the suit: "This Court has long held that a suit
to restrain unconstitutional action threatened by an individual who is a
state officer is not a suit against the State. These decisions were re-
examined and reaffirmed in Ex parte Young . . . and have been con-
sistently followed to the present day.... The State is free to carry out its
functions without judicial interference directed at the sovereign or its
agents, but this immunity from federal jurisdiction does not extend to
individuals who act as officers without constitutional authority. 3 4
The statement just quoted is the dominant principle; it is usually,
though not always, reliable.3 5
In the 1912 case of Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,36 the Court made
clear that not only an officer who acts under an unconstitutional statute
but also an officer who acts in excess of his authority may be enjoined,
even though the effect is to enjoin the government. A statute authorized
the Secretary of War to fix a harbor line beyond which the building of
piers or other works was a misdemeanor. The plaintiff sued to enjoin
the Secretary from prosecuting the plaintiff on account of construction
of a wharf beyond the line the Secretary had fixed. The principal
question was whether the Secretary had gone too far in interfering with
the plaintiff's property rights. Mr. Justice Hughes summarized the law
for the unanimous Court: "The exemption of the United States from
32 Id. at 173-174.
33 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
34 Id. at 304, 305-306.
35 The exceptions are discussed in the following section.
36 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
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suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons
whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.... The principle
has frequently been applied with respect to state officers seeking to
enforce unconstitutional enactments. . . And it is equally applicable
to a Federal officer acting in excess of his authority or under an authority
not validly conferred. 3 7
The Court in the Philadelphia Company case recognized no exception
to this broad statement of principle. It did not carve out an exception
to take care of issues about property. Indeed, in one aspect of the case,
the problem was one of property ownership, and the Court specifically
said: "If the conduct of the defendant [the Secretary] constitutes an
unwarrantable interference with property of the complainant, its resort
to equity for protection is not to be defeated upon the ground that the
suit is one against the United States." Another formulation in the opinion
seems especially significant: "The suit rests upon the charge of abuse
of power, and its merits must be determined accordingly; it is not a suit
against the United States."38
Down through the years the Supreme Court has permitted suits against
officers, to test constitutionality or limits of authority. In Hammer v.
Dagenhart,9 the suit was to enjoin Hammer, a United States Attorney,
from enforcing the child labor statute. In Waite v. Macy,40 the suit was
to enjoin Waite and his colleagues, members of a tea board, from for-
bidding importation of tea containing artificial coloring. Hill v. Wallace4 1
was a suit to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from taking any steps
to compel the Board of Trade to comply with the Grain Futures Act.
Ickes v. Fox4 2 was a suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
refusing certain irrigation water in which the plaintiffs had property
rights.
That the unconstitutionality claimed need not be unconstitutionality of
a statute is entirely clear. After all, in the 1882 case of United States v.
Lee,43 the Court talked the language of due process of law concerning the
possession by the officers of property belonging to the plaintiff. In Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,44 the Court held that the
37 Id. at 619-620.
38 Id. at 620.
39 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
40 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
41 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
42 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
43 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882).
44 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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Attorney General's action was unconstitutional in putting the organiza-
tion on the subversive list, but no statute was involved. In Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,45 the Court held that the President's seizure
of the steel mills was unconstitutional, because no statute had authorized
the seizure.
The plain fact can hardly be overemphasized that in each of these cases
the plaintiff's real purpose and the practical effect of the decision were
to put a stop to the governmental processes which the plaintiff was
challenging, including even programs enacted by Congress. The form is
suit against the officer; the reality is suit against the government.
III. CASES HOLDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY A DEFENSE IN SUITS
AGAINST OFFICERS WHO ALLEGEDLY ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OR IN EXCESS OF AUTHORITY
In a few cases the Supreme Court seems to forget the fiction that a
suit against an officer in his official capacity is not a suit against the
government and to be actuated by the reality. We turn now to these
cases--cases in which sovereign immunity is held a bar to a suit against
an officer who is allegedly acting either unconstitutionally or in excess of
authority.
In the 1908 case of Louisiana v. Garfield,46 Louisiana sued the Secre-
tary of the Interior and another officer to establish title to certain swamp
lands and to enjoin the officers from making other disposition of the
lands. The Secretary's predecessor had interpreted an Act of 1849 as
conveying the land to Louisiana and had written an endorsement, "ap-
proved to the state of Louisiana." Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion
for a unanimous Court: "We will assume, for purposes of decision, that,
if the United States clearly had no title to the land in controversy, we
should have jurisdiction to entertain this suit, for we are of opinion that,
even on that assumption, the bill must be dismissed."47 The Court then
proceeded to hold that the Secretary's "approval" to Louisiana was
based upon a "manifest mistake of law" and was therefore "void upon
its face.' 45 Title was accordingly in the United States. In this aspect,
Louisiana successfully sued.the United States without its consent, but lost
on the merits. The Court, however, went on to consider whether a statute
limiting suits by the United States to vacate patents to five years applied
to approvals when they are given the effect of patents: "The doubt is
45 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
46 211 U.S. 70 (1908).
47 Id. at 75.
48 Id. at 77.
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whether Louisiana has not now a good title by the lapse of five years
since the approval. ... But that doubt cannot be resolved in this case.
It raises questions of law and of fact upon which the United States
would have to be heard. . . . It follows that the United States is a
necessary party and that we have no jurisdiction of this suit.149
The holding that sovereign immunity prevents the Court from deciding
the limitation issue is quite unsatisfactory. If the courts may not decide
such issues about ownership of real property, then the courts are deprived
of power at the precise point where they are best qualified and nost
useful. The opinion is also unsatisfactory in that, by passing upon the
principal question of title and then holding that sovereign immunity
prevents a decision on the question of limitation, the Court seems to hold
that the Court will decide the merits when the merits are clearly in
favor of the United States, but that when the merits are doubtful, sover-
eign immunity prevents the Court from deciding the merits.
The holding that sovereign immunity was a bar to determination of
the limitation issue is inconsistent with many other cases. In United
States v. Lee, 0 a question of title to real property was resolved in a suit
against officers, even though the officers claimed that title was in the
United States. The Court in the Louisiana case could have used the
technique of Ex parte Young; 5 it could have said that if the Secretary
was taking Louisiana's land without compensation52 he is "stripped of
his official or representative character."
If courts may put an end to major programs enacted by Congress, as
they have often done in suits against officers, how curious that sovereign
immunity prevents courts from putting an end to a wavering decision of
the Secretary of the Interior concerning ownership of swamp lands. One
might think that a suit which is in reality against the government is more
appropriate to determine ownership of real property than it is to kill a
program which the people's representatives have enacted.
Another important case in which"sovereign immunity was a bar to a
49 Id. at 77-78. The holding that sovereign immunity was a bar in one aspect of the
case is closely similar to both an earlier decision and a later decision. New Mexico v. Lane,
243 U.S. 52 (1917); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906).
A statement that the United States is an indispensable party is the equivalent in sub-
stance of a statement that sovereign immunity bars the suit against the officer. Nothing of
substance depends upon the form of statement.
50 106 US. 196 (1882).
51 209 US. 123, 160 (1908).
52 The complainant argued, as reported in 211 U.S. at 73, that the Secretary should
not be "permitted to exert his agency in violating the law and the Constitution and then




suit against an officer who was assertedly acting unconstitutionally is
Morrison v. Work.5" The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior
and other officers, on behalf of Chippewa Indians, asserting that the
defendants "undertook to modify or to ignore rights of the Chippewas
which had become fixed by the agreements ' of 1890. The plaintiff
asserted that the defendants were acting unconstitutionally and without
authority. The case came up on motion to dismiss the complaint. For
a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "Morrison's contention
is that ... the rights of the Indians in the lands and in the fund to be
formed became fixed as individual property.... The claim of the United
States is, at least, a substantial one. To interfere with its management
and disposition of the lands or the funds by enjoining its officials, would
interfere with the performance of governmental functions and vitally
affect interests of the United States. It is, therefore, an indispensable
party to this suit."5 4
The Court ignored the Lee case, 5 where government officers were
ejected from land even though the claim of the United States was a
substantial one. The Court did not mention the usually-followed principle
of Ex parte Young56 that unconstitutional or unauthorized action of an
officer strips him of his official or representative character. The Court
said nothing of the proposition it had laid down in Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson: "The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect
its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property
they have wrongfully invaded. ' 57
The central proposition of the Morrison opinion is directly opposed to
many other cases: "If through officials of the United States these lands,
or the proceeds thereof, or the accruing interest, are improperly disposed
of, it is the United States, not the officials, which is under obligation to
account to the Indians therefor .... ,,58 This proposition, if consistently
applied, would prevent all suits against officers when the real purpose is
to sue the government-even including the scores of cases in which the
purpose is to challenge constitutionality of a statute.
53 266 U.S. 481 (1925).
54 Id. at 489-486.
55 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
56 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
57 223 U.S. at 619-620. Tending to support the Morrison decision is Naganab v. Hitch-
cock, 202 U.S. 473 (1906). An Indian sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
diverting to unlawful purposes lands conveyed to the United States and held in trust,
"without due process of law." The Court held that because legal title was in the government,
and because the Secretary had no interest in the controversy, the suit was in effect against
the government.
58 266 U.S. at 487-488.
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The latest and possibly most important case in which the Supreme
Court has held sovereign immunity a bar to a suit to enjoin allegedly
unconstitutional action of an officer is Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal.59
The Under Secretary of the Navy determined that the company had
received excessive profits under the Renegotiation Act and notified the
company that unless it took action to eliminate the profits he would direct
government disbursing officers to withhold payments due the company
on other contracts. The company sought an injunction and declaratory
judgment that the Renegotiation Act was unconstitutional. The Court
held the government to be an indispensable party. The Court reasoned:
"The sole purpose of this proceeding is to prevent the Secretary from
taking certain action which would stop payment by the government of
money lawfully in the United States Treasury to satisfy the government's
and not the Secretary's debt to the appellant. The assumption underlying
this action is that if the relief prayed for is granted, the government will
pay and thus relinquish ownership and possession of the money."60
The Court's statement so far is unquestionable. But the Court continued:
"In effect, therefore, this is an indirect effort to collect a debt allegedly
owed by the government in a proceeding to which the government has
not consented."6 This statement is demonstrably a non sequitur. To
prevent the Secretary from interfering with payment of the debt is one
thing; to collect the debt is quite another. The plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion against unconstitutional interference, not an order to pay. If the
injunction had been granted against the Secretary, the disbursing officers
would still have been free to pay or not to pay.
The basic doctrine of Ex parte Young,6" applied in scores of other
cases, was fully applicable, for the Court could have indulged in the
fiction that if the Secretary was acting under an unconstitutional statute,
he was "stripped of his official or representative character and is sub-
jected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct."
The Court specifically acknowledged the principle established by the
Philadelphia Company case63 and other cases that if the Secretary, "act-
ing as an individual and not as an officer of the government, '64 was
committing a tort consisting of a trespass against the company's property,
59 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
60 Id. at 374-375.
61 Id. at 375.
62 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908).
63 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
64 The Court in the Mine Safety case quoted this part of the fiction without questioning
it, and with apparent approval. 326 U.S. at 373.
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then the company would be entitled to equitable relief. But the Court
held this principle to be inapplicable because "Here, the essential allega-
tions and the relief sought do not make out a threatened trespass against
any property in the possession of or belonging to the appellant."6 5
If one may believe the opinion in the Mine Safety case, then, the law
is that sovereign immunity does not prevent a court from enjoining an
officer's unconstitutional trespass against tangible property of the plain-
tiff, but sovereign immunity does prevent a court from enjoining an
officer's unconstitutional interference with an intangible right of the plain-
tiff to receive money. Why sovereign immunity should depend upon
tangibility or intangibility of the right to be protected the Court does not
attempt to explain.
Not only was the suit in the Mine Safety case not an "effort to collect
a debt allegedly owed by the government," but even if it were, the as-
sumption that an injunction against an officer cannot be granted to help
a plaintiff collect a debt owed by the government is highly questionable.
True, the United States can be named as the defendant only in the
Court of Claims when the purpose is to collect a debt. But the suit in
the Mine Safety case named the Under Secretary as the defendant.
Why not follow consistently the fiction that when the officer acts uncon-
stitutionally or without authority he is stripped of his official or repre-
sentative character? The Supreme Court in other cases has granted
relief even when the purpose was to collect a debt owed by the govern-
ment. For instance, in Roberts v. United States ex rel. Valentine,66 the
Court held that mandamus should be issued against the Treasurer of the
United States ordering him to pay certain money to the plaintiff; the
Court reasoned merely that the duty to pay was "ministerial" and that
therefore "mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his duty.16 7
In Miguel v. McCarl,68 the Comptroller General had advised a disburs-
ing officer not to pay the plaintiff a retirement allowance, and the Su-
preme Court held that a mandatory injunction against the disbursing
officer was proper "directing a disposal of petitioner's application for
pay upon the merits, unaffected by the opinion of the Comptroller
General, and in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion as to
the proper interpretation and application of the pertinent statutes."6 9
The Roberts and Miguel holdings are to be preferred to the Mine
65 326 U.S. at 374.
66 176 U.S. 221 (1900).
67 Id. at 229-230.
68 291 U.S. 442 (1934).
69 Id. at 456.
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Safety holding because government responsibility is to be preferred to
government irresponsibility, and because courts are better qualified'than
executive officers to decide questions of law about contracts and debts and
constitutionality.
According to a 1944 opinion, the practitioner should take care, in suing
an officer to enjoin unconstitutional or unauthorized action, to sue the
officer "personally," and not "officially." The theory of Ex parte Young
was that the suit was "against him [the officer] personally as a wrongdoer
and not against the State."7° The case which makes clear what happens
if the officer is sued officially instead of individually-and thereby reaches
an all-time maximum of harmful formalism-is Great Northern Ins. Co.
v. Read.7 1 The company paid an Oklahoma tax under protest and sued
the officer to recover the money paid. The Supreme Court held that "the
suit was against the official, not the individual," 72 and that an Oklahoma
statute specifically providing for suits against collecting officers to recover
taxes paid was limited to suits in Oklahoma courts and did not apply to
federal courts even though it said nothing about either Oklahoma courts
or federal courts."
Although winning or losing a case may thus depend upon the difference
between an individual and an official, the Court does not tell us how to
detect the difference. It does not even bother to mention how the
defendant was designated. The title of the case in the official report shows
that the defendant was "Read, Insurance Commissioner." The record
70 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908).
7' 322 U.S. 47 (1944). Accord: Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana,
323 U.S. 459 (1945). The Ford case also holds that the defense of the Eleventh Amend-
ment may be raised for the first time in the Supreme Court, and that the state attorney
general's defense of the case on the merits was not a waiver of sovereign immunity under
the Indiana law.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573 (1946), the Court
followed the Read case even though the Utah statute provided that suit could be brought
in a "court of competent jurisdiction." Three of the seven participating justices dissented.
72 322 U.S. at 53.
73 The statute provides that "the aggrieved person shall pay the full amount of the taxes
... and shall give notice to the officer collecting ... that suit Will be brought against the
officer for recovery of them. It shall be the duty of such collecting officer to hold such taxes
separate and apart. ... All such suits shall be brought in the court having jurisdiction
thereof. . . ." Okla. Stat. § 12665 (1951).
Even if the idea of sovereign immunity is followed, nothing in the nature of things
prevents a suit against an officer in his official capacity. For instance, in Garfield v. United
States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908), the Court granted mandamus against the
Secretary of the Interior even though in the first sentence of the opinion the Court said
that the suit was against the Secretary "in his official capacity." Traditionally, when the
government is the real defendant, the Court has not distinguished between official capacity
and personal capacity of officers.
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shows that the complaint designated the defendant as "Jess G. Read,
Insurance Commissioner for State of Oklahoma, Defendant." A close
reading of the complaint fails to answer the artificial but all-important
question whether the defendant in collecting the tax was acting as an
official, as an individual, or as both an official and an individual.
Mr. Justice Reed for the majority apparently bases his assumption
that "the suit was against the official, not the individual" upon the as-
sumption that the suit was under the Oklahoma statute, and upon the
further assumption that a suit under the statute could not be a suit
against the individual. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissent asserts the
assumption that the suit was not under the statute but was "an ordinary
common law action." 74 The complaint seems consistent with either a
statutory or a common-law proceeding.
The one feature of the Great Northern case that is entirely clear is
that sovereign immunity was a bar only because the plaintiff failed to put
into the complaint the right magic words. The suit should have been
against the individual and not against the official. Perhaps the combined
requirements of extreme technicality and acceptable humor would be
satisfied by a designation of the defendant as "Jess G. Read, as an indi-
vidual who is 'stripped of his official or representative character' as Okla-
homa Insurance Commissioner by reason of the unconstitutionality of the
statute under which he collected the tax money which this action is
brought to recover."
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS
WHO ACT WITHIN VAiD AUTHORITY
Circumvention of sovereign immunity is easy when the courts can
indulge in the fiction that an officer acts as an individual when he acts
unconstitutionally or in excess of his authority. When the officer is
acting within authority conferred by a valid statute, a court is more likely
to consider the action to be against the sovereign.
The key case is Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.75
The War Assets Administration sold some coal to the plaintiff, interpreted
the contract to require a deposit, and when an unsatisfactory letter of
credit was offered in place of a deposit, entered into a contract to sell
the coal to another. The plaintiff sought an injunction against selling
the coal to anyone but the plaintiff, and a declaratory judgment that the
sale to the plaintiff was valid and the sale to the second purchaser invalid.
74 322 U.S. at 64.
75 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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The Court first emphasized that the contract was with the United
States, not with the officer personally, and then it said that "the crucial
question is whether the relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to the
officer is relief against the sovereign."7 6 The Court said nothing to indi-
cate awareness of the plain fact that in a large proportion of the many
cases in which officers are enjoined the reality -is that the relief is against
the sovereign. The Court said that "where the officer's powers are limited
by statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual
and not sovereign actions," and that unconstitutional conduct is "not
the conduct of the sovereign. 7 The Court then declared: "These two
types have frequently been recognized by this Court as the only ones in
which a restraint may be obtained against the conduct of Government
officials. ' 78 For this, the Court quoted from Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson79
a passage which does not support the "only" in the Court's statement,
and it offered neither reasoning nor authority to support the "only." The
Court specifically rejected the argument that an officer's tortious or
"illegal" taking of property may be enjoined, for tort or illegality is not
sufficient: "Since the sovereign may not be sued, it must also appear that
the action to be restrained or directed is not action of the sovereign."80
The Court stated its specific holding in the form of a generalization:
"We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms
of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign,
whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they would be
regarded as the actions of a private principal under the normal rules of
agency.")81
The Court almost reached the basic problem of policy when it said:
"There are the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that such
relief cannot be had against the sovereign. The Government, as repre-
sentative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks
by any plaintift who presents a disputed question of property or contract
right."82 The Court did not say what the "reasons of public policy" are,
except for the statement of the conclusion about stopping the Government
in its tracks. If that conclusion means only that the plaintiff's case on
the disputed question of property or contract right must have merit
76 Id. at 687.
77 Id. at 689-690.
78 Id. at 690.
79 223 US. 605, 620 (1912).
80 337 U.S. at 693.
81 Id. at 695.
S2 Id. at 704.
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before the Government can be stopped in its tracks, then it is hardly
worth stating. In the context of refusal to consider the plaintiff's argu-
ment concerning the interpretation of the contract of sale, the Court's
statement evidently means that even one who has a meritorious case
concerning a disputed question of property or contract right cannot stop
the Government in its tracks. This proposition is the equivalent of a
statement that the courts have no role to play if the government is law-
less in disregarding the property and contract rights of a private party.
Only a little regard for the practical facts that property and contract
rights may be better determined by adjudication than by use of force,
and that no other authority is so well equipped as a court to determine
such rights might have led the Court to say exactly the opposite-that
there are the strongest reasons of public policy for permitting courts to
decide disputed questions of property or contract rights, even when a
government officer is one of the parties, and even when no claim of un-
constitutionality or excess of authority is made.
The law of the Larson case seems to be that the courts may not
adjudicate the disputed contract and property rights. Even if the plaintiff
owned the coal, and even if the Government was committing a tort in
taking it, still the plaintiff has no redress. The issues must be resolved
by some means other than adjudication in the courts.
The Larson holding is directly opposed to the simple, fundamental,
and sound proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the basic
decision of United States v. Lee: "Courts of justice are established, not
only to decide upon controverted rights of the citizens as against each
other, but also upon rights in controversy between them and the govern-
ment. . .. "83
Yet the Court in the Larson opinion purported to distinguish the Lee
case. In that case the Court entertained the suit to eject government
officers from land to which the government claimed title. On their facts,
the Larson and Lee cases are on all fours, except that the one involved
a dispute over coal and the other a dispute over real property. The Court
did not purport to distinguish the facts of the Lee case; instead, it said
that the basis for the decision was lack of constitutional authority of the
officers to keep the land if the title was in the plaintiff. In this aspect,
the Larson case turned upon failure of the plaintiff's counsel to put the
right magic words into the complaint: "There is no allegation of any
statutory limitation on his [the Administrator's] powers as a sales agent.
. . . There is no claim that his action constituted an unconstitutional
83 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
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taking. '8 4 The plaintiff should have alleged-so we are told-that no
statute had authorized the Administrator to commit a tort, and that the
taking of the plaintiff's coal without compensation was a denial of due
process.
The Court in the Larson opinion, being unable to distinguish Goltra v.
Weeks, 5 found an overruling or disapproval of that case to be necessary.
Government officers in the Goltra case attempted to repossess certain
barges in the plaintiff's possession, and the Court held that a suit to
enjoin them from doing so was not a suit against the United States. For a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft said: "If it was a trespass, then
the officers of the Government should be restrained whether they pro-
fessed to be acting for the Government or not.... By reason of their
illegality, their acts or threatened acts are personal and derive no official
justification from their doing them in asserted agency for the Govern-
ment."' 6 The Court in the Larson case specifically rejected the Goltra
view and asserted "the principle which has been frequently repeated by
this Court, both before and after the Goltra case: the action of an officer
of the sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise legally affecting the
plaintiff's property) can be regarded as so 'illegal' as to permit a suit for
specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within
the officer's statutory powers or, if within those powers, only if the
powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally
void." 87
Aside from the fundamental assumption of the Goltra opinion that
property rights should be adjudicated by courts and the fundamental
assumption of the Larson case that the courts cannot interfere with
action of government officers even if it is lawless, the Goltra case differs
from the Larson in the Court's assumption that "trespass" should be
treated as unauthorized. The Court in the Larson case assumed that even
if the Administrator's action was a trespass it was authorized: "There is
no allegation of any statutory limitation on his powers as a sales agent.
In the absence of such a limitation he, like any other sales agent, had
the power and the duty to construe such contracts and to refuse delivery
in cases in which he believed that the contract terms had not been
complied with. His action in so doing in this case was, therefore, within
his authority even if, for purposes of decision here, we assume that his
construction was wrong and that title to the coal had, in fact, passed to
84 337 U.S. at 703.
85 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
86 Id. at 544. Mr. Justice McReynolds wrote a rather vehement concurring opinion.
S7 337 U.S. at 701-702.
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the respondent under the contract."" As a matter of logic, it would have
been easier to say that the officer was not authorized to commit a tort.
As a matter of policy, the view that the officer was not authorized to
commit a tort would have meant that property rights could be determined
by courts.
If the Court means what it says in discrediting the Goltra case, then
government officers may seize possession of a citizen's property, and the
citizen has no legal redress, even though the sole issue presented is one
of property lawl Law which is at once so unjust and so impracticable
is not likely to endure; the Goltra case in the long run will survive its
overruling.
The Court in the Larson opinion reduced to a footnote its effort to
distinguish three additional cases. The Sloan Shipyards case 9 was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the defendant was not an officer but a
government corporation "which had not acted in the name of the United
States but in its own corporate name and right."90 The illogic of the
distinction can be seen by a statement of the law that seems to result
from this part of the footnote: If the government commits a tort through
an individual officer the court may not enjoin the tort, but if the govern-
ment commits a tort through a government corporation which acts
through an individual officer, the court may enjoin the tort.
Land v. Dollar91 is a very important decision, even though the Court
in the Larson opinion disposed of it in eight lines of a footnote. Stock-
holders of the Dollar Steamship Lines entered into a contract in 1938
with the Maritime Commission; they delivered their common stock to
the Commission, endorsed in blank, and the Commission released some
of them from certain obligations, agreed to grant the company an operat-
ing subsidy, and agreed to make a loan to the company and to obtain
for it another loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. After
the debts to the government had been fully paid, the stockholders
demanded return of their stock, claiming it had been pledged as collateral
for a debt which had been paid. Members of the Commission refused
on the ground that the stock had been transferred outright and not as
a pledge. The suit was then brought against members of the Commission,
praying that defendants be restrained from selling the stock and be
directed to return it to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the
suit was not against the United States.
88 Id. at 703.
89 Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922).
90 337 U.S. at 702.
91 330 U.S. 731 (1937).
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The Court said that the defendants would be unlawfully withholding
plaintiffs' property under the claim that it belongs to the United States
"if either of [the plaintiffs'] contentions were established: (1) that the
Commission had no authority to purchase the shares or acquire them
outright; or (2) that, even though such authority existed, the 1938
contract resulted not in an outright transfer but in a pledge of the
shares.912 After holding the Lee case applicable and after distinguishing
opposing authority, the Court stated the governing principles: "But
public officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their
authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or
chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not
relegated to the Court of Claims to recover a money judgment. The
dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the victim who
may bring his possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully
withheld.193
The holding in the Dollar case and the statement of principles on which
the holding was based are both fully applicable to the facts of the Larson
case, for the plaintiff in the latter case asserted that the public officials
were unlawfully seizing the plaintiff's coal. In the Larson case footnote;
however, the Court purported to distinguish the Dollar case by saying
"it was contended that any other kind of acquisition [than a pledge]
would constitute a violation of § 207 of the Merchant Marine Act,
which allegedly gave the Commission authority to acquire stock only as
collateral. The complaint therefore alleged that the members of the
Commission 'acted in excess of their authority as public officers.' "9
It is true that the complaint in the Dollar case alleged excess of
authority. But that was only one of two contentions. The other conten-
tion was that, as the Court put it, "even though such authority [to
acquire the shares outright] existed, the 1938 contract resulted not in
an outright transfer but in a pledge of the shares."95 That the holding in
the Dollar case did not rest upon excess of authority is entirely clear, for
the case was remanded to the district court with the instruction that "if
it is decided on the merits either that the contract was illegal or that
respondents [plaintiffs] are pledgors, they are entitled to possession of
the shares. .... ,,96 (Emphasis supplied.)
The footnote in the Larson case purporting to distinguish the Dollar
92 Id. at 735-736.
93 Id. at 738.
94 337 U.S. at 702.
95 330 U.S. at 735-736.
96 Id. at 739.
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case thus rests upon a clear-cut mistake. The Dollar case still stands as
authority for the proposition that if the shares were pledged as collateral
for a debt that has been paid, the pledgors may recover possession in a
suit against the officers, even though the contract was not between the
plaintiffs and the officers but was between the plaintiffs and the Maritime
Commission. The Dollar and the Larson cases are squarely opposed, and
the law of the future may follow either one. Nothing in the Larson
opinion answers the observation in the Dollar opinion that when govern-
ment officers unlawfully seize property, "The dominant interest of the
sovereign is then on the side of the victim....
The third case the Court distinguished in its Larson footnote was Ickes
v. Fox;98 the Court was right in saying that the decision rested in part
upon the theory that the officer was acting in excess of his authority.
The Court in the Larson opinion thus unsatisfactorily distinguished
three cases-Lee,, Sloan, and Dollar-and satisfactorily distinguished
the Fox case. It did not try to distinguish the Goltra case, and accord-
ingly overruled it. The only case the Court used in support of its decision
was Goldberg v. Daniels,,9 which was a suit for mandamus to compel
the Secretary of the Navy to deliver a government criser to the plaintiff,
who had submitted the highest bid in response to the Secretary's ad-
vertisement for bids. Except for citations, the entire opinion on the
sovereign immunity question was in two sentences: "The United States
is the owner, in possession of the vessel. It cannot be interfered with
behind its back, and, as it cannot be-made a party, this suit must fail."'100
Although it was the Court's sole authority in the Larson opinion, the
Goldberg case is both distinguishable and questionable. In the Goldberg
case, the government was the owner; in the Larson case, the question
whether the government was the owner was the question the plaintiff
wanted to litigate. In the Larson case, the plaintiff sought to prevent un-
lawful taking of property; in the Goldberg case, the plaintiff sought to
compel affirmative action that was within the Secretary's discretionary
authority. In the Dollar case the Court had no difficulty distinguishing
the Goldberg case; it said merely that the Dollar suit was "not an attempt
to get specific performance of a contract to deliver property of the United
States."'' The principal idea of the Goldberg opinion that the United
97 Id. at 738.
98 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
99 231 U.S. 218 (1913).
100 Id. at 221, 222.
101 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737 (1947). In the Larson case, the suit was not to get
specific performance of the contract to sell coal; the prayer was for an injunction against
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States cannot be "interfered with behind its back" seems to overlook the
fact that the Solicitor General was representing the Secretary, as the
report of the case shows. The Goldberg case was probably sound in
result, but the reason should have been that the Court in the circum-
stances would not compel the Secretary to exercise his discretion in a
particular manner.
The Court in the Larson case could more appropriately have relied
upon International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, °2 which provides better
support for the Larson decision than does the Goldberg case, and which
is one of the simplest outrages ever committed in the name of sovereign
immunity. The plaintiff sought to, enjoin a local postmaster from infring-
ing the plaintiff's patent on a stamp cancelling and postmarking machine.
The Court held that because the postmaster had no personal interest
in the use of the machine, "the suit really was against the United
States."'1 03 The Court said that the United States had the "right" to
use the machine under the terms of a lease of the machine, and that
"This right cannot be interfered with behind its back." 04 Yet the post-
master was represented by an Assistant Attorney General, as the report
of the case shows.
The decision in the Larson case was six to three, with Mr. Justice
Douglas concurring in a short opinion, Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring
in the result, Mr. Justice Jackson dissenting without opinion, and Mr.
Justice Frankfurter writing a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Burton concurred.
Mr. Justice Douglas said cryptically: "To make the right to sue the
officer turn on whether by the law of sales title had passed to the buyer
would clog this governmental function with intolerable burdens." 0 5 Mr.
Justice Douglas does not explain wherein the law of sales is so "intoler-
able" that it cannot be applied to the government as a seller of coal.
Nor does he explain why, if the law of sales is "intolerable," it should
be applied to private sellers of coal. He goes no further than to take
the position that the government as a seller must enjoy special privileges
that other sellers do not enjoy. The argument seems to be that the
sovereign must be above the law that applies to others! The king can
do no wrong--even in this American democracy!
sale of the coal to anyone but the plaintiff, and for a declaration that the sale to the
plaintiff was valid and the sale to the other purchaser invalid.
102 194 U.S. 601 (1904).
103 Id. at 605. The Court relied heavily upon a similar holding in Belknap v. Schild,
161 U.S. 10 (1896).
104 194 U.S. at 606.
105 337 U.S. at 705.
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Nearly all Supreme Court opinions on sovereign immunity in suits
against officers focus upon a narrow segment of the whole subject. This
fact in part explains the inconsistencies. The outstanding modern effort
to deal with the subject comprehensively is that of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in his dissent in the Larson case."0 6 The opinion is valuable for
its analysis of some of the principal cases, and for its partial collection,
in an appendix, of Supreme Court decisions "concerning suits against
governmental agents in which defense of sovereign immunity was
raised."'1 7 The Frankfurter analysis abundantly supports the observation
that "The subject is not free from casuistry."'' 0
Yet caution is necessary in relying on the Frankfurter opinion, for the
board generalizations are far from satisfactory. Of his first category of
"Cases in which the plaintiff seeks an interest in property which con-
cededly, even under the allegation of the complaint, belongs to the
government, or calls for an assertion of what is unquestionably official
authority,"' 0 9 he says: "The governing principle is clear enough. If a
defendant is asked to transfer the possession or title of property which is
the Government's, judged by the conventional tests of possession or
ownership, or if he is asked to exercise authority with which the State
has invested him and the desired action is in fact governmental action
so far as an individual is ever pro tanto the impersonal government,
such demands are effectively demands upon the sovereign, which require
the sovereign's consent as a prerequisite to the grant of judicial
remedies.""u 0
This so-called "governing principle" is in two parts. The first part
seems to say that sovereign immunity bars a court from ordering an
officer "to transfer the possession or title of property which is the Govern-
ment's, judged by the conventional tests of possession or ownership."
Of course, apart from sovereign immunity, a court will not order a
transfer of title of government property unless the plaintiff is legally
-entitled to the transfer. The fact is that the Supreme Court has often
ordered government officers to transfer government property to plaintiffs
106 For an article the thesis of which is that sovereign immunity should not be a defense
when the officer acts without valid authority but should be a defense when he acts within
valid authority, see Block, "Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity
Doctrine," 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946).
107 337 U.S. at 729.
108 Id. at 708.
109 Id. at 709-710. The first category clearly overlaps each of the other three. Indeed,
each of Mr. justice Frankfurter's four categories overlaps each of the others, except that
categories two and three do not overlap each other.
110 Id. at 712.
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who are held to be entitled to such a transfer."1 An outstanding example
is Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krusnic,"2 in which the Supreme
Court granted mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior to compel
issuance of a land patent to one who was held to have located a mining
claim on property which, apart from the location of the claim, was
concededly the government's.
Does the second part of the "governing principle" mean that the
decisive question is whether the relief sought requires affirmative official
action, as distinguished from an injunction? If so, is Mr. Justice Frank-
furter ignoring the law of mandamus as it has been applied in suits
against officers for more than a century?"' When is "the desired
action.., in fact governmental action"? If the court orders the Secretary
of the Interior to issue a patent to land, as it did in the Krusknic
case," 4 is the Secretary's action "in fact governmental action"? If it is,
then a whole line of Supreme Court decisions is contrary to the Frank-
furter statement." 5 If it is not, then how can any action of any officer
ever be "in fact governmental action"?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's second category is "Cases in which action
to the legal detriment of a plaintiff is taken by an official justifying his
action under an unconstitutional statute.""' 6 He summarizes the law of
this category: "The matter boils down to this. The federal courts are
III In addition to the Krushnic case see: United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880)
(holding that title had passed to petitioner from the government, and officer was therefore
ordered to deliver land patent); Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249
(1908) (holding that relator's name was unlawfully erased from rolls, thereby depriving
him of 320 acres of land; mandamus granted against officer to restore status quo) ; Ballinger
v. United States ex rel. Frost, 216 U.S. 240 (1910) (mandamus granted to compel Secretary
to issue land patent to one in whom Court held title had vested).
112 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
113 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838); Roberts v. United States ex rel.
Valentine, 176 U.S. 221 (1900); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306
(1930). In each of these cases and in many others the Supreme Court has approved the
issuance of mandamus to compel officers to take affirmative action.
All experience shows the unworkability of a line between the affirmative and the negative.
The test under Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947), has caused confusion precisely
because it depends upon the difference between affirmative and negative decrees-a difference
which has proved impossible to apply. See the discussion infra at p. 29.
Mr. justice Frankfurter himself demonstrated in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States,
307 U.S. 125, 140-142 (1939) that it had become "abundantly clear that 'negative order'
and 'affirmative order' are not appropriate terms of art. . . . 'Negative' and 'affirmative,'
in the context of these problems, is as unilluminating and mischief-making a distinction as
the outmoded line between 'nonfeasance' and 'misfeasance."'
114 Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
115 All four cases cited above in notes 111 and 112 are such cases.
116 337 U.S. at 710.
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not barred from adjudicating a claim against a governmental agent who
invokes statutory authority for his action if the constitutional power to
give him such a claim of immunity is itself challenged."" 7 This must
be an inadvertence, for no case cited involves a challenge of the constitu-
tionality of giving a governmental agent either immunity or "a claim of
immunity." Mr. Justice Frankfurter continues: "Sovereign immunity
may, however, become relevant because the relief prayed for also entails
interference with governmental property or brings the operatiop of
governmental machinery into play. The Government then becomes an
indispensable party and without its consent cannot be implicated."' 18
This language seems to say that sovereign immunity is a bar to judicial
determination of the merits of a case. when the relief prayed either
(1) entails interference with governmental property or (2) brings the
operation of governmental machinery into play. Let us examine each of
these two propositions.
When a plaintiff prays for relief that entails interference with govern-
mental property, he asserts either that what he prays is not interference
or that the property is not the government's. In the usual case, the plain-
tiff claims an interest in property and the government's officer refuses to
convey title or to deliver possession. Is such a plaintiff barred by sover-
eign immunity? Mr. Justice Frankfurter seems to say that he is. But
since the cases hold both yes"' and no, 20 an unqualified statement either
way is unjustified.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter says that sovereign immunity is a bar when
the relief prayed "brings the operation of governmental machinery into
play.'' s2 This resembles his earlier statement that sovereign immunity is
"17 Id. at 715.
118 Ibid.
119 Mr. justice Frankfurter properly cites Morrison V. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925). He
might also properly have cited New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917); Louisiana v.
Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908); and Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906).
120 Unitbd States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) is directly in point. In an ejectment suit
against officers who asserted that title was in the United States, the Court held that
sovereign immunity was no defense.
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947) is a recent holding that sovereign immunity is not
a defense to a suit in which a plaintiff sought possession of property held by officers who
were acting on behalf of the government.
In all four cases cited above in notes 111 and 112 sovereign immunity failed to prevent
litigation of the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to a land patent; in each
case the Court approved a writ of mandamus compelling the defendant officer to issue a
patent.
121 The cases of the first category are listed twice, once in the footnote to the statement
of the first category, and once in the appendix to the opinion, but three of the eighteen
cases of the appendix are omitted from the footnote, without explanation. The heading in
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a bar if "the desired action is in fact governmental action."' 12 Both tests
seem to depend upon the unworkable affirmative-negative distinction. 23
If in the Larson case the decree had enjoined the Administrator from
transferring the coal to the second purchaser, would the decree have
brought the operation of governmental machinery into play? Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's answer must be no, for sovereign immunity would be a bar
if it did, and the purpose of his dissent was to argue that sovereign im-
munity was not a bar. Then, when does a decree bring governmental
machinery into play? The answer must be, when it requires affirmative
action. For instance, if a writ of mandamus compels the Secretary of the
Interior to issue a land patent to the plaintiff, governmental machinery
must be brought into play when the Secretary complies. But if this is
the meaning of the Frankfurter statement-and what else can it mean?-
then it is directly opposed to the line of cases approving writs of
mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to issue land patents.'24
The Frankfurter statement is directly opposed to such cases as Kendall
v. United States,125 where the Supreme Court issued mandamus ordering
the Postmaster General to credit the relators with an amount of money;
Roberts v. United States ex rel. Valentine,'2 6 where the Supreme Court
issued mandamus to compel the Treasurer of the United States to pay
interest on certificates; Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby,12 7
the appendix is: "Plaintiff sought interest in property which concededly belong to the
Government, or demanded relief calling for an assertion of what was unquestionably official
authority." Why the two seemingly incompatible parts are put together into one category
is unexplained. Some of the cases listed are hard to square with the heading. In Governor
of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (U.S. 1828), the plaintiff asserted a right to slaves held by
the governor, and to proceeds of sale of slaves; the slaves did not "concededly" belong
to the State. The case went off on the ground that the governor was sued by title and
not by name.
Five of the eighteen cases were suits by holders of state bonds, seeking to collect or
seeking action to help them collect; possibly it was the money which "concededly" belonged
to the states.
In Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896), a suit was brought to enjoin naval officers from
infringing a patent. What property "concededly" belonged to the government is unclear
unless it was the property used in the infringement. The suit did not seek an assertion
of official authority, but an injunction against continued infringement.
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906), and Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908)
did not involve property which "concededly" belonged to the government, for in both
cases the plaintiff claimed the property. The only assertion of "unquestionably official
authority" involved issuance of a land patent to the plaintiff.
122 337 U.S. at 712.
123 See note 113 supra.
124 Four such cases are cited in notes 111 and 112 supra.
125 12 Pet. 624 (U.S. 1838).
126 176 U.S. 221 (1900).
127 211 U.S. 249 (1908).
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where the Court issued mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior
to erase certain marks and notations striking the name of Goldsby from
the rolls; and Miguel v. McCarl,'28 where the Court affirmed a mandatory
injunction against a disbursing officer "directing a disposal of petitioner's
application for pay upon the merits, unaffected by the opinion of the
Comptroller General" that the petitioner was not entitled to the pay.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter generalizes later in the opinion: "When a
pleading raises a substantial claim that the defendant is wrongfully with-
holding from the plaintiff property belonging to him; the defendant has
not heretofore been permitted to shield himself behind the immunity of
the sovereign."' 29 In at least three Supreme Court decisions, the de-
fendant officer successfully shielded himself behind the immunity of the
sovereign, when such a substantial claim was raised. 30
Analysis of the Frankfurter analysis goes far toward proving that a
comprehensive treatment of the law of this subject must be partly crea-
tive if it is to succeed in advancing a set of intelligible principles.
V. JUDGMENTS IN SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS AS RES JUDICATA AGAINST
THE GOVERNMENT WHEN GOVERNMENT COUNSEL DEFEND
The cases on sovereign immunity as a defense have only occasionally
considered the vital question whether sovereign immunity affects the
normal operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Obviously, a judgment
against an officer is binding upon the same officer, and a judgment against
the government is binding upon both the government and its officers.
The troublesome problem is whether a judgment against an officer is res
judicata against the government or against other officers.
The Supreme Court made a clear statement of principle in 1940 in
Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins:31 "There is privity between officers
of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party
and a representative of the United States is res judicata in relitigation
of the same issue between that party and another officer of the govern-
ment." This statement seems plausible enough, for both the first and the
second suit can depend upon the fiction that the officer instead of the
government is the party to the litigation, thereby avoiding the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. The holding, however, was not that a judgment
against an officer was binding upon another officer of the same govern-
128 291 U.S. 442 (1934).
129 337 U.S. at 726.
130 New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908);
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906).
131 310 U.S. 381, 402-403 (1940).
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ment, for the party to the first suit was not an officer but was the Bitumi-
nous Coal Commission, an agency of the government.
Under the doctrine of the Sage and Nunnally cases, 132 a judgment in
a suit by a taxpayer against a federal tax collector is not binding upon
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or upon the United States. But
these cases have been explicitly overruled by statute.'33 Furthermore,
they are distinguishable from the present problem in that a suit against
a tax collector has a unique tradition of its own. For instance, a suit
against a collector cannot be continued against his successor, 34 although
suits against other officers customarily can be continued against their
successors.,35 The law that makes a suit against a collector so peculiarly
personal rests upon statutes.3 6  The Supreme Court has at least twice
specifically refused to apply the law concerning a suit against a col-
lector to a suit against another officer.' 37
Another guide from the tax field is the Supreme Court's holding in
Tait v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. 138 that a suit against the Commissioner
132 Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 33 (1919); United States v. Nunnally Investment
Co., 316 U.S. 258 (1941).
133 56 Stat. 956 (1942), 26 U.S.C. § 3772(d) (1952).
'34 Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1 (1921).
135 E.g., Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
136 The original case held the collector liable at common law. Elliott v. Swartwout, 10
Pet. 137 (U.S. 1836). But after Congress enacted a requirement that collectors pay money
collected into the Treasury, the Supreme Court held the collector not personally liable.
Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236 (U.S. 1845). But Congress later recognized such suits. E.g., Rev.
Stat. § 989 (1878). See the explanation in Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co., 257 U.S. 1 (1921).
See Plumb, "Tax Refund Suits against Collectors of Internal Revenue," 60 Harv. L. Rev.
685 (1947).
137 In Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940), the Court said that cases
holding that a judgment in a suit against a collector is not a bar to a subsequent suit by
or against the United States are not in point because the suit against the collector is personal.
In Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 18 (1950), the action was against Buck, Paymaster
General of the Navy for an order to pay an allowance. The Court distinguished a suit
against a tax collector: "The complaint in this case makes no claim against Buck personally.
Therefore we put to one side cases such as Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, dealing with
actions in assumpsit against collectors for taxes erroneously collected. The writ that issued
against Buck related to a duty attaching to the office.'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, agreed with the Court that a suit to compel the
Paymaster General of the Navy to pay an allowance was not a personal action and added:
"That suits against a collector of revenue for illegal exactions under the Revenue Acts are
deemed personal actions enforceable as such against the collector is an anomalous situation
in our law which calls for abrogation instead of extension."
138 289 U.S. 620, 627 (1933): ". . . where a question has been adjudged as between
a taxpayer and the Government or its official agent, the Commissioner, the Collector, being
an official inferior in authority, and acting under them, is in such privity with them that




is binding in a subsequent action against the United States and the
collector. The Tait case is unaffected by the unique considerations that
apply to the res judicata effect of judgments in suits against collectors.
But a suit against the Commissioner is probably a suit against the office,
not against the officer.
An important additional factor affecting the question whether the
government is bound by a judgment against an officer is the consistent
practice of government counsel defending suits against officers whenever
the government, disregarding the fiction, is the real defendant. When this
factor is taken into account, the reasons in favor of res judicata become
much stronger. The basic principle that comes into play is neatly and
authoritatively stated by the Restatement of Judgments: "A person who
is not a party but who controls an action, individually or in co-operation
with others, is bound by the adjudication of litigated matters as if he
were a party if he has a proprietary or financial interest in the judgment
or in the determination of a question of fact or of a question of law with
reference to the same subject matter or transaction; if the other party
has notice of his participation, the other party is equally bound." 8 9
The Supreme Court has laid down "the principle that one who prose-
cutes or defends -a suit in the name of another, to establish and protect
his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action
in aid of some interest of his own, and who does this openly, to the
knowledge of the opposing party, is as much bound by the judgment,
and as fully entitled to avail himself of it, as an estoppel against an
adversary party, as he would be if he had been a party to the record." 40
This principle is clearly a necessary feature of the law of res judicata
for the purpose of res judicata is to prevent a relitigation of the same
issues between the same parties or their privies. If in a suit against an
officer the only counsel for the officer is a government lawyer, and if the
officer has no personal interest in the action, the government is obviously
the real party in interest for purposes of carrying out the policy behind
the doctrine of res judicata.
The argument to the contrary is that the government cannot be sued
without its consent and that only Congress can give consent. Should this
argument prevail?
Although the Supreme Court's decisions on this question are confused,
as we shall presently see, the answer seems clear as a matter of principle.
Even if we accept the idea that the government cannot be sued unless
139 Restatement, judgments § 84 (1942).
140 Souffront v. La Compagnie des Scureries, 217 US. 479, 486 (1910).
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Congress consents, the conclusion does not follow that the government
cannot become bound by a judgment unless Congress consents, and the
problem here is whether the government becomes bound, not whether it
can be sued. That the government can become bound by a judgment in
absence of consent of Congress is entirely dear. Whenever government
lawyers bring a suit on behalf of the government as a plaintiff, the govern-
ment becomes bound by the judgment. The reasons behind the doctrine
of res judicata-avoiding relitigation of the same issues between the
same parties or their privies-are just as strong whether the government
is a plaintiff or a defendant in the first proceeding, and whether the
government is a party both in form and in substance or only in substance.
The Supreme Court's holdings have often been in" accord with this
understanding of principle. Such a holding is Gunter v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co. 4' In the first proceeding a stockholder sued the railroad
and the treasurers of two counties to enjoin the railroad from paying and
the treasurers from collecting certain taxes. A joint answer was filed
for the treasurers, signed by "The Attorney General for the State of
South Carolina, for defendants." An injunction was granted, which the
Supreme Court affirmed in 1873. In 1900 a new act was passed by the
legislature of South Carolina, and the Attorney General of the state
thereafter commenced actions against the successor railroad to collect
the tax that had been enjoined. The question whether the state was
bound by the decree in the first proceeding was thus squarely presented.
The Court said that "the inquiry reduces itself to this: Did the State of
South Carolina become, in substance and effect, a party to the [first]
case?'1 42 The Court said that "the State was directly interested" because
officers characterized as "nominal defendants" were charged with the
141 200 U.S. 273 (1906). A forerunner of the Gunter case was the holding in New
Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U.S. 371 (1897). The case was the sixth time the bank
had litigated the question of exemption from taxation, the first three times under the
original charter, and the last three under an extended charter. The problem in the sixth
case was whether the judgments in the fourth and fifth cases were res judicata. In the
fourth case the bank had sued the state board of assessors, the state auditor, the city of
New Orleans, and the state tax collector. In the fifth case the bank had sued the board of
assessors. In the sixth suit the defendants were the city of New Orleans, the board of
assessors for the parish of Orleans, and the state tax collectors for the various taxing
districts in the parish of Orleans, and a supplemental bill was filed against the sheriffs of
thirteen, parishes in the State of Louisiana outside the parish of Orleans, who were ex
officio tax collectors. The Court held the prior judgments res judicata, even though the
tax was for different years.
In City of New Orleans v. Whitney, 138 U.S. 595 (1891), the Court had held that a
city was bound by decrees against grantees of the city because the city had assumed the
defense of the suits; the Court said nothing of sovereign immunity.
142 200 U.S. at 284.
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collection of both county and state taxes.143 After noting a statute
authorizing the county treasurer to employ counsel and to pay fees and
damages that might be awarded against the treasurer, the Court laid down
the proposition that "where a suit was brought against a county treasurer
in respect to county taxes, that official was empowered to represent the
county for the purpose of the defense of its interest, and a judgment
rendered against such official was therefore made binding upon the
county."' 144 The Court accordingly held that the state and the Attorney
General were "privies to and bound by the decree" of the first case.
Another clear-cut holding is United States v. Candelaria,145 where the
Supreme Court said in answer to a certified question: "But, as it appears
that for many years the United States has employed and paid a special
attorney to represent the Pueblo Indians and look after their interests,
our answer is made with the qualification that, if the decree was rendered
in a suit begun and prosecuted by the special attorney so employed and
paid, we think the United States is as effectually concluded as if it were
a party to the suit." Since this statement was made in partial answer to
a certified question, it must be regarded as a square holding.
In 1945 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Candelaria holding when it
added a slight qualification in another Indian case: "If the United States
in fact employs counsel to represent its interest in a litigation or other-
wise actively aids in its conduct, it is properly enough deemed to be a
party and not a stranger to the litigation and bound by its results .... But
to bind the United States when it is not formally a party, it must have a
laboring oar in a controversy."'1 46 The qualification that the government
must have "a laboring oar" has no effect in the typical case in which the
only attorneys representing the defendant officer are in the employ of
the government.
The Gunter, Candelaria, and Drummond cases axe strong and clear
authorities,'147 even though the Supreme Court at times either has been
unaware of them or has knowingly disregarded them.
The best authority to the contrary is the 1878 case of Carr v. United
143 Id. at 285.
144 Id. at 286.
345 271 U.S. 432, 444 (1926).
146 Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318 (1945).
147 In City of Elmhurst v. Kegerreis, 392 Il. 195, 64 N.E.2d 450 (1945), a judgment
against a building superintendent was held res judicata against a city on the theory that
the city was in privity with its superintendent. In Millikan v. City of LaFayette, 118




States.14 8 The government brought a bill to quiet title, and the defendants
asserted that previous judgments in suits brought against officers and
defended by government attorneys were res judicata. In holding against
this defense, the Court was actuated by the idea that when it appears
"that the possession attempted to be assailed was that of the government
... the jurisdiction of the court ought to cease. Otherwise, the govern-
ment could always be compelled to come into court and litigate with
private parties in defense of its property."' 49 The holding is weakened
by its assumption that the law was the opposite of what the Court held
in the Lee case only four years later.'50
The Carr case, however, does not stand alone. It was followed in a
dictum in the important case of United States v. Lee,'' in a holding in
1911,152 and in several dicta in the Dollar case of 1947.11 In the Dollar
opinion, the Court gave no indication that it inquired into the question
any further than the dictum in the Lee case.
The Supreme Court has thus failed to enunciate clear and consistent
law on the question whether a judgment in a suit against an officer is res
judicata against the government. The authority that such a judgment
is res judicata is probably stronger than the opposing authority. Reason
and policy are emphatically on the side of res judicata. After a case
has been litigated between a private party and government attorneys who
are representing the government's interest, the government should be
bound in the same way that any other litigant would be bound, unless
we insist on the divine right of kings to such an extent that we want to
waste the time of parties and of courts in multiple litigation of the same
issues.
VI. PERSPECTIVE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In practical effect, the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been partially unmade by the judges, but the extent of the unmaking
fluctuates drastically from one Supreme Court case to another. The
148 98 U.S. 433 (1878).
149 Id. at 438.
150 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
151 Id. at 222. See also the dictum in Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1896).
152 Hussey v. United States, 222 U.S. 88 (1911). In Bank of Kentucky v. Kentucky,
207 U.S. 258 (1907), a judgment against one county and members of a state board was
held not binding on another county.
153 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 736, 737, 739 (1947). A court of appeals in later
Dollar litigation considered itself bound by these dicta. United States v. Dollar, 196 F.2d
551 (9th Cir. 1952).
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring separately in Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299,
307 (1952), thought that the state should be bound by a prior judgment against an officer,
distinguishing Land v. Dollar on the ground of absence of "special circumstances."
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theory that the government cannot be sued without its consent continues,
but the practicality is that the government usually can be sued without
its consent if the plaintiff will falsely pretend that his suit is against an
officer, and not against the government. The form of sovereign immunity
continues, but the substance is often largely gone; even when the sub-
stance has given way to the needs of justice, the form lingers on.
The principal escape from the substance of sovereign immunity has
been by way of the fiction which is best exemplified by the leading case
of Ex parte Young, that an officer who acts without valid authority is
"stripped of his official or representative character."'5 4 This fiction has
served the needs of justice in innumerable cases and it should be con-
tinued and expanded. The weakness of the fiction is that it is a fiction;
unpredictable results stem from the occasional judicial action taken on
the basis of the realization that a suit which is nominally against an
officer is in reality a suit against the government. Substantive harm
results not from the fiction but from departures from the fiction.,5
The Supreme Court usually holds that sovereign immunity does not
prevent a suit against an officer who acts either unconstitutionally or in
excess of authority. The Court should consistently so hold. The excep-
tional cases in this category cannot be justified either analytically or on
policy grounds. Suits against officers to test the constitutionality of
statutes are very common; courts in such cases have often put an end to
programs enacted by Congress and by state legislatures. In this perspec-
tive, the cases refusing to enjoin illegal action of an officer on the ground
that an injunction "would interfere with the performance of governmental
functions"' 58 seem quite incongruous, for the result is that courts may
interfere with choices made by the people's representatives but not with
choices made by a single officer. In another aspect, the result is that
courts may pass upon the policy problems that Congress has decided
but may not pass upon the problems of property or contracts law that
an administrative officer has decided. The need in this category of cases
is for a consistent application of the principle that sovereign immunity
does not prevent enjoining an officer's unconstitutional or unauthorized
154 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
155 It is arguable that abolition of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is preferable
to continuing the fiction. But the less radical recommendations here made will satisfy all
reasonable needs and leave the more drastic action to Congress. Furthermore, keeping
the law of suits against state officers in the federal courts the same as the law of suits
against federal officers in the federal courts is advantageous, and the Eleventh Amendment
cannot be changed basically by judicial action.




action. This principle should be applied irrespective of the question
whether the court's order will require affirmative governmental action,
and irrespective of the question whether the subject matter is property or
contracts or torts or constitutionality. The Court should follow its hold-
ings in the Kendall, Roberts and Miguel cases;' the cases that cannot
be reconciled with these three cases, including the prominent cases of
Louisiana v. Garfield, Morrison v. Work, and Mine Safety Co. v. For-
restal, should be overruled.158
The recent effort to make decisive the distinction between suing an
officer personally and suing an officer officially is unworkable and should
be discontinued. The Court has not provided and probably cannot
provide satisfactory criteria to determine when an officer is an individual,
when he is an official, and when he is both; in absence of such criteria,
the attempted law-making in Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read 59 is
palpably unsound. The Court should permit suits against officers to
challenge authority and constitutionality irrespective of the distinction
between individual and official action.
The area of greatest confusion about sovereign immunity as a defense
is in the cases in which no claim is made of unconstitutionality or excess
of authority. The Supreme Court should follow its holdings in the Lee,
Goltra, and Dollar cases. 6 0 These three holdings should be made the
foundation for future law, and the Court should overrule all decisions
that are irreconcilable, including especially the Larson case' 6 ' in which
the Court discredited the Goltra case and purported to distinguish the
Lee and Dollar cases. The basic principle should be simply that of Ex
parte Young-that an officer who acts illegally is "stripped of his official
or representative character"' 62 for purposes of application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. An officer should be deemed to act illegally not
only if he acts unconstitutionally and not only if he acts contrary to or
157 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838) (mandamus order against Postmaster
General requiring him to credit relators with an amount of money); Roberts v. United
States ex rel. Valentine, 176 U.S. 221 (1900) (mandamus against Treasurer of the United
States to compel payment of money); Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) (mandatory
injunction to disbursing officer directing disposal of claim unaffected by opinion of Comptrol-
ler General).
158 Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925);
Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945). Each of these cases is fully discussed
in the foregoing pages.
159 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
160 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926);
Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1937).
161 Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
162 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908).
1954]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
in excess of specific limitations on his authority but also if he acts
contrary to the legal rights of the plaintiff, whether those rights involve
property, contract, or other law. What is needed is a return to the
proposition laid down by Chief Justice Taft in the Goltra case: "If it
was a trespass, then the officers of the Government should be restrained
whether they professed to be acting for the Government or not.... By
reason of their illegality, their acts or threatened acts are personal and
derive no official justification from their doing them in asserted agency
for the Government."'-" In this passage, the word "trespass" should be
interpreted to include any and all interference with legal rights of the
plaintiff, whether tangible or intangible. In other words, in absence of
clear statutory authority, an officer should be deemed to be without
authority to commit a trespass or any other tort, to violate the plaintiff's
contract or property rights, or to take any other action which interferes
with what the court recognizes as legal rights of the plaintiff.:" 4
The practical effect of the recommendation just made is to reduce the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to a right of, Congress to authorize
government infringement of the legal rights of private parties without
judicial redress. In absence of such authorization from Congress, sover-
eign immunity will never prevent a suit against an officer for relief other
than money damages. Existing statutes, of course, may be interpreted
as providing such authorization.
The Supreme Court has held both ways on the question whether a
judgment in a suit against an officer should be res judicata against the
government. The Court should resolve the inconsistencies in favor of the
cases holding that the government is bound. The government is bound
when government lawyers institute a proceeding on behalf of the govern-
163 Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536, 544 (1926).
164 The most radical feature of this proposal is the idea that an officer should be held
to have no authority to break a valid contract with a private party. But this idea is already
the law in such cases as Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838) ; Roberts v. United
States ex rel. Valentine, 176 U.S. 221 (1900); Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934).
In other words, even the most radical feature of the proposal involves no more than
getting rid of inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's holdings.
From the standpoint of both justice and desirable policy, the notion that the courts
should not enforce against the government a contract which the government has freely
entered into is thoroughly pernicious. The Supreme Court might take a leaf out of the
book of an enlightened state court to see how simply the notion can be rejected. A good
example is Meens v. State Board of Education, 267 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1954). The
sole question was whether the state board of education could be sued for breach of
contract. In holding that it could be, the court relied upon authority that "Where
there is an act of the state Legislature authorizing a contract by a state department, the
courts have power to enforce the contract against the state."
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ment as a plaintiff; the government should equally be bound when
government lawyers on behalf of the government defend a suit against an
officer. Otherwise, the same issues will be litigated more than once
between the same real parties. The government as a party to litigation
should have no special privileges that are not equally enjoyed by other
litigants. Here, as elsewhere, the divine right of kings has no place in
twentieth-century America.
